Archives for category: History

This year sees the 50th anniversary of a book that – whether through inspiration, disagreement or unintended hints – has been hugely influential in the history and philosophy of science (HPS). It is Thomas Kuhn‘s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which was discussed in this great piece by John Naughton in the Guardian last week.

For me, Kuhn’s influence feels somewhere near second or third hand. Responses to him informed the work of my tutors and supervisors, and have long been part of the daily bread of those training in HPS. Considering where we have got to, and how much we have (or haven’t) achieved since Kuhn, is a regular hobby.

Someone who recently did this particularly well, making a convincing case for development in the discipline, is Greg Radick in his inaugural lecture on becoming professor at the Centre for History and Philosophy of Science at Leeds. I therefore wanted to share on this blog some of his ideas about the directions in which our field has moved, or is moving.

Radick is particularly interesting in being able to work between history and philosophy – areas that have become increasingly separated since Kuhn’s time – and with scientists as well as colleagues in the humanities. As he shows in the lecture, some of his and the discipline’s newer approaches take us considerably beyond Kuhn and his immediate legacy, although its significance remains.

I remember that I loved to read Christa Wolf’s Cassandra in a Portuguese translation.

Christa Wolf was born on March 18, 1929 in Landsberg/Warthe, today Gorzó Wielkopolski in Poland. In 1945 she moved to Mecklenburg, and in 1949 she graduated from high school and joined the SED, the former East German Communist Party. She studied German literature in Jena and Leipzig. Later she became a member of the German Writers’ Association, working as editor of the magazine “Neue deutsche Literatur” and chief editor of Neues Leben publishing house. In 1961 she published her first prose work, “Moscow Novella”. The book was well received in the GDR, but not published in the Federal Republic. Since that time she has worked as a freelance author. Her first big success was the novel “Divided Heaven”, which deals with the divided Germany. The book won her the prestigious East German Heinrich Mann Prize, and was made into a movie by East German filmmaker Konrad Wolf in 1964.

From 1963 to 1967, Christa Wolf was a candidate of the Central Committee of the SED, but resigned after giving a critical speech. In 1974 she became a member of the East German Academy of Arts, and from 1981 on was also a member of the Academy of Arts in West Berlin. In 1976 she spoke out against the denaturalisation of singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann. She was allowed to travel freely, and gave visiting lectures in the Federal Republic, Italy, Scotland, Switzerland and the USA starting 1978.

In 1983, her book “Cassandra” appeared, dealing with the conflict between the sexes. The book made her an all-German author and was her biggest international success. In 1987 she was also presented the 1st Class National Prize of the GDR. Two years later, in June 1989, she left the Communist Party – five months before the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In 1990 she published “What Remains”, a strongly autobiographical short story documenting her supervision by the Ministry for State Security. The book initiated a discussion on the complicity of intellectuals in the misanthropical conditions of the GDR. Christa Wolf was attacked in the West as a “hypocrite” and “state poet”, whereupon she retired from public life.

1993 brought a further benchmark. Christa Wolf acknowledged she had been an unofficial informant for the Ministry for State Security. She herself published the files documenting her engagement at this time. In all, Christa Wolf has written over thirty books, radio plays and film scenarios. In 1996 her novel “Medea” appeared. As with “Cassandra” it adopts the narrative voice of a figure from the world of ancient mythology.

In 2003 her book “Ein Tag im Jahr” (one day in the year) appeared, comprising her minutes from the day on each September 27th over the past four decades.

Just don’t miss it!

The president of the French republic raised a mountain, and it has fallen on his toes. In launching its offensive against the Roma, the French government believed it could turn to its electoral advantage a problem which is essentially a problem of border policing and the state authorities. Major error. The question of the Roma is not about public or social security, it is about mental security. And it is not a uniquely French problem, it is a European problem.

After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the American daily the Los Angeles Times conducted one of the first polls in Eastern Europe in 1990. The results showed that for 80 percent of the populations freshly freed from Communism – Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians and Poles, the ‘Gypsy’ was the incarnation of the diabolical other.

In the nineties and in the face of strong popular resistance, Czech President Vaclav Havel tore down a ghetto where his people wanted to see the “travelling people” incarcerated. The hatred of the “Gypsies” may be widespread and have seen its worse excesses in Eastern Europe, but it is certainly no stranger to the West. Nineteen century literature and opera – from Victor Hugo to Verdi – amply betrays the fears of the sedentary about the non-territorial collective. Begging, disease, thieving, and even fantasies about child snatching – such were the associations that for centuries haunted a European mind living in fear of “people who don’t live as we do”. Propelling this hysteria to its extreme, the Nazis sent these “sub-humans” to the gas chambers.

Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser were the three main forces behind the organization’s creation. Kwame Nkrumah, the Marxist pan-African leader of Ghana, and Ahmed Sukarno, the leader of Indonesia, would also put their weight behind the NAM and join Tito, Nehru, and Nasser. These leaders and their countries did not view the Cold War as an ideological struggle. This was a smokescreen. The Cold War was a power struggle from their perspectives and ideology was merely used as a justification.

(here in  Portuguese)

The word “non-alignment” was first used on the world stage by Vengalil Krishnan Krishna Menon, India’s ambassador to the United Nations, while the term “Third World” was first used by the French scholar Alfred Sauvy. Third World is a debated political term and some find it both deregulatory and ethnocentric. To the point of confusion the phrase Third World is inextricably intertwined with the concept of non-alignment and the NAM.
Both the NAM and, especially, Third World are wrongly and carelessly used as synonyms for the Developing and Under-developing Worlds or as economic indicators. Most Third World countries were underprivileged former colonies or less affluent states in places like Africa and Latin America that were the victims of imperialism and exploitation. This has led to the general identification or misidentification of the NAM countries and the Third World with concepts of poverty. This is wrong and not what either of the terms means.
Third World was a concept that developed during the Cold War period to distinguish those countries that were not formally a part of the First World that was formed by the Western Bloc and either the Eastern/Soviet Bloc and Communist World that formed the Second World. In theory most these Third Worlders were neutral and joining the NAM was a formal expression of this position of non-alignment.

Aside from being considered Second Worlders, communist states like the People’s Republic of China and Cuba have widely been classified as parts of the Third World and have considered themselves as parts of the third global force. Chairman Mao’s views defined through his concept of Three Worlds also supported the classification of communist states like Angola, China, Cuba, and Mozambique as Third Worlders, because they did not belong to the Soviet Bloc like Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the most orthodox of interpretations of the political meaning of Third World, the communist state of Yugoslavia was a part of the Third World. In the same context, Iran due to its ties to NATO and its membership in the US-controlled Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was politically a part of the First World until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Thus, reference to Yugoslavia as a Second World country and Iran as a Third World country prior to 1979 are incorrect.

The term Third World has also given rise to the phrase “Global South.” This name is based on the geographically southward situation of the Third World on the map as opposed to the geographically northward situation of the First and Second Worlds, which both began to collectively be called the “Global North.” The names Global North and Global South came to slowly replace the terms First, Second, and Third World, especially since the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed.

The NAM formed when the Third Worlders who were caught between the Atlanticists and the Soviets during the Cold War tried to formalize their third way or force. The NAM would be born after the Bandung Conference in 1955, which infuriated the US and Western Bloc who saw it as a sin against their global interests.

Contrarily to Western Bloc views, the Soviet Union was much more predisposed to accepting the NAM. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev even proposed in 1960 that the UN be managed by a “troika” composed of the First, Second, and Third Worlds instead of its Western-influenced secretariat in New York City that was colluding with the US to remove Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba from power in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as other independent world leaders.

Fidel Castro and Cuba, which hosted the NAM’s summit in 1979 when Iran joined as its eighty-eighth member, would actually argue that the Second World and communist movements were the “natural allies” of the Third World and the NAM. The favorable attitudes of Nasser and Nehru towards the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc’s support for various national liberation movements also lends credence towards the Cuban argument about the Second and Third World alliance against the capitalist exploitation and imperialist policies of the First World.

The first NAM summit would be held in the Yugoslavian capital of Belgrade in 1961 under the chairmanship of Marshall Tito. The summit in Belgrade would call for an end to all empires and colonization. Tito, Nehru, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sukarno and other NAM leaders would demand that Western Europeans end their colonial roles in Africa and let African peoples decide their own fates.

A preparatory conference was also held a few months earlier in Cairo by Gamal Abdel Nasser. At the preparatory meetings non-alignment was defined by five points:

(1) Non-aligned countries must follow an independent policy of co-existence of nations with varied political and social systems;

(2) Non-aligned countries must be consistent in their support for national independence;

(3) Non-aligned countries must not belong to a multilateral alliance concluded in the context of superpower or big power politics;

(4) If non-aligned countries have bilateral agreement with big powers or belonged to a regional defense pact, these agreements should not have been concluded in context of the Cold War;

(5) If non-aligned states cede military bases to a big power, these bases should not be granted in the context of the Cold War.

All the NAM conferences to follow would cover vital issues in the years to come that ranged from the inclusion of the People’s Republic of China in the UN, the fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo, African wars of independence against Western European countries, opposition to apartheid and racism, and nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the NAM has traditionally been hostile to Zionism and condemned the occupation of Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, and Egyptian territories by Israel, which has earned it the seamlessly never-ending aversion of Tel Aviv.

Education and Cuba Libre, 1898-1958

The last Spanish colony in the Americas, Cuba launched a second war for independence in 1895, more than half a century after the establishment of independent republics in the rest of Spanish America. However, the intellectual war against Spanish domination began earlier, before the first failed revolution of 1868-78.

In particular, many nineteenth-century Cuban intellectuals, including Jose Marti, believed that the Catholic education of the colonial period, available only to elite men, operated as a means of suppressing national liberation by preaching loyalty to crown and church. Cuba Libre or Free Cuba, they argued, the independent and democratic nation for which so many Cubans fought and died, could not be successfully established without the foundation of a system of free, universal, secular public education.

(…)

Fears persisted that the United States intended to annex the island. While Cubans expressed gratitude for US efforts to construct a public educational system, accusations that the military government planned to ‘americanize’ education fuelled these fears of annexation.

What provoked these accusations? The American administration modelled Cuba’s public educational system on that of the United States. The school law of the state of Ohio provided the model for Cuba’s school law. US curriculum formed the basis for the new Cuban curriculum, which employed Spanish translations of US textbooks. The military government sent Cuban teachers to the United States for training and US educators came to Cuba to design and teach in the new educational system.

(…)

And after the 1959 Revolution

Fidel Castro and his followers understood the disillusionment, cynicism and frustration afflicting the country. They took up the cry of the nation’s past liberators and, when futile peaceful protest against Batista exposed the sham of the republic’s institutions, they turned to the long tradition of armed struggle for the sake of Cuba Libre. Castro claimed for his movement the legacy of Cuba’s apostle, Jose Marti. He reminded the country of Marti’s words. ‘An educated people’, Marti had believed, ‘will always be strong and free’.

During his trial after the unsuccessful assault on the Moncada barracks in 1953, Castro exposed the nation’s misery. He included an economic analysis in his nationalist appeal and declared:

«Our educational system is a perfect complement to our other problems. In a country where the farmer is not the owner of the land, why should any man want agricultural schools? In a city where there is no industry, what need is there for technical or industrial schools? … Less than half of the children of school age attend rural public schools, and those who do are barefoot, half naked, and undernourished. Many times it is the teacher who buys the necessary school materials with his own salary. Is this the way to make a nation great?»

Cubans agreed that it was not. When the fidelistas offered them a new dream of Cuba Libre, it is little wonder they followed.

 by Ethan Zuckerman.

The Islamic Revolution was a surprise because it had taken root in mosques and homes, not palaces or barracks. The calls to resist the shah weren’t broadcast on state media but transmitted via handmade leaflets and audiocassettes of speeches by Ayatollah Khomeini. In their book analyzing the events of 1979, Small Media, Big Revolution (1994), Annabelle Sreberny and Ali Mohammad, who both participated in the Iranian revolution, emphasize the role of two types of technology: tools that let people obtain access to information from outside Iran, and tools that let people spread and share that information on a local scale. Connections to the outside world (direct-dial long-distance phone lines, cassettes of sermons sent through the mail, broadcasts on the BBC World Service) and tools that amplified those connections (home cassette recorders, photocopying machines) helped build a movement more potent than governments and armies had anticipated.

As we enter an age of increased global connection, we are also entering an age of increasing participation. The billions of people worldwide who access the Internet via computers and mobile phones have access to information far beyond their borders, and the opportunity to contribute their own insights and opinions. It should be no surprise that we are experiencing a concomitant rise in mystery that parallels the increases in connection.

The unexpected outbreak of the Arab Spring, a mystery that’s still unfolding, suggests that we may not be getting this full picture, or the deep, unconventional thinking we need. Had you asked an expert on the Middle East what changes were likely to take place in 2011, almost none would have predicted the Arab Spring, and none would have chosen Tunisia as the flashpoint for the movement. Zine el Abidine Ben Ali had ruled the North African nation virtually unchallenged since 1987, and had co-opted, jailed, or exiled anyone likely to challenge his authority. When vegetable seller Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, there was no reason to expect his family’s protests against government corruption to spread beyond the village of Sidi Bouzid. After all, the combination of military cordons, violence against protesters, a sycophantic domestic press, and a ban on international news media had, in the past, ensured that dissent remained local.

Not this time. Video of protests in Sidi Bouzid, shot on mobile phones and uploaded to Facebook, reached Tunisian dissidents in Europe. They indexed and translated the footage and packaged it for distribution on sympathetic networks such as al-Jazeera. Widely watched in Tunisia, al-Jazeera alerted citizens in Tunis and Sfax to protests taking place in another corner of their country, which in effect served as an invitation to participate. As Ben Ali’s regime trembled and fell, images of the protests spread throughout the region, inspiring similar outpourings in more than a dozen countries and the overthrow of two additional regimes.

While the impact of Tunisia’s revolution is now appreciated, the protests that led to Ben Ali’s ouster were invisible in much of the world. The New York Times first mentioned Mohamed Bouazizi and Sidi Bouzid in print on January 15, 2011, the day after Ben Ali fled. The U.S. intelligence apparatus was no more prescient. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D.-Calif.), who chairs the Senate Intelligence Committee, wondered to reporters, “Was someone looking at what was going on the Internet?”

A central paradox of this connected age is that while it’s easier than ever to share information and perspectives from different parts of the world, we may be encountering a narrower picture of the world than we did in less connected days. During the Vietnam War, television reporting from the frontlines involved transporting exposed film from Southeast Asia by air, then developing and editing it in the United States before broadcasting it days later. Now, an unfolding crisis such as the Japanese tsunami or Haitian earthquake can be reported in real time via satellite. Despite these lowered barriers, today’s American television news features less than half as many international stories as were broadcast in the 1970s.

The pace of print media reporting has accelerated sharply, with newspapers moving to a “digital first” strategy, publishing fresh information online as news breaks. While papers publish many more stories than they did 40 years ago (online and offline), Britain’s four major dailies publish on average 45 percent fewer international stories than they did in 1979.

Why worry about what’s covered in newspapers and television when it’s possible to read firsthand accounts from Syria or Sierra Leone? Research suggests that we rarely read such accounts. My studies of online news consumption show that 95 percent of the news consumed by American Internet users is published in the United States. By this metric, the United States is less parochial than many other nations, which consume even less news published in other countries. This locality effect crosses into social media as well. A recent study of Twitter, a tool used by 400 million people around the world, showed that we’re far more likely to follow people who are physically close to us than to follow someone outside our home country’s borders, or even a few states or provinces away. Thirty-nine percent of the relationships on Twitter involve someone following the tweets of a person in the same metropolitan area. In the Twitter hotbed of São Paulo, Brazil, more than 78 percent of the relationships are local. So much for the death of distance.

As we start to understand how people actually use the Internet, the cyberutopian hopes of a borderless, postnational planet can look as naive as most past predictions that new technologies would transform societies. In 1912, radio pioneer Guglielmo Marconi declared, “The coming of the wireless era will make war impossible, because it will make war ridiculous.” Two years later a ridiculous war began, ultimately killing nine million Europeans.

While it’s easy to be dismissive of today’s Marconis—the pundits, experts, and enthusiasts who saw a rise in Internet connection leading to a rise in international understanding—that’s too simple and too cynical a response. Increased digital connection does not automatically lead to increased understanding. At the same time, there’s never been a tool as powerful as the Internet for building new ties (and maintaining existing ones) across distant borders.

The challenge for anyone who wants to decipher the mysteries of a connected age is to understand how the Internet does, and does not, connect us. Only then can we find ways to make online connection more common and more powerful.

There are at least three ways we discover new information online. Each of these methods has shortcomings in terms of giving us a broad, global picture of the world. Search engines, while incredibly powerful, are only as good as the queries we put to them. They are designed for information retrieval, not for discovery. If you had been able to ask Google in 1979 how many SS-9 missiles the Soviets possessed, you might have received a plausible answer, but you wouldn’t have been told you should be asking about cassette recorders in Iran instead. Search engines tell us what we want to know, but they can’t tell us what we might need to know.

Social media such as Facebook or Twitter might tell you to pay attention to cassette recordings in Iran, but only if your friends include Iranians. Social media are a powerful discovery engine, but what you’re discovering is what your friends know. If you’re lucky enough to have a diverse, knowledgeable set of friends online, they may lead you in unexpected directions. But birds of a feather flock together, both online and offline, and your friends are more likely to help you discover the unexpected in your hometown than in another land.

As Pankaj Ghemawat of Barcelona’s IESE Business School reminds us in World 3.0 (2011), we’re not at the endpoint of globalization, but somewhere near the starting line. The age of connection is just beginning. Many people still view the world as dominated by secrets: How close is Iran to building a nuclear bomb? How can Western companies crack the Chinese market? Where are undiscovered reserves of oil? It’s at least as possible that the questions that will dominate the next century are the ones we don’t yet know to ask. Those who will thrive in a connected world are those who learn to see broadly and to solve the mysteries that emerge.

 

The origin of the symbol itself, one of the most graceful characters on the keyboard, is something of a mystery. One theory is that medieval monks, looking for shortcuts while copying manuscripts, converted the Latin word for “toward”—ad—to “a” with the back part of the “d” as a tail. Or it came from the French word for “at”—à—and scribes, striving for efficiency, swept the nib of the pen around the top and side. Or the symbol evolved from an abbreviation of “each at”—the “a” being encased by an “e.” The first documented use was in 1536, in a letter by Francesco Lapi, a Florentine merchant, who used @ to denote units of wine called amphorae, which were shipped in large clay jars.

The symbol later took on a historic role in commerce. Merchants have long used it to signify “at the rate of”—as in “12 widgets @ $1.” (That the total is $12, not $1, speaks to the symbol’s pivotal importance.) Still, the machine age was not so kind to @. The first typewriters, built in the mid-1800s, didn’t include @. Likewise, @ was not among the symbolic array of the earliest punch-card tabulating systems (first used in collecting and processing the 1890 U.S. census), which were precursors to computer programming.

The symbol’s modern obscurity ended in 1971, when a computer scientist named Ray Tomlinson was facing a vexing problem: how to connect people who programmed computers with one another. At that time, each programmer was typically connected to a particular mainframe machine via a phone connection and a teletype machine—basically a keyboard with a built-in printer. But these computers weren’t connected to one another, a shortcoming the U.S. government sought to overcome when it hired BBN Technologies, the Cambridge, Massachusetts, company Tomlinson worked for, to help develop a network called Arpanet, forerunner of the Internet.

The Colombian government has signed a formal agreement with the FARC to start a peace process to end the armed conflict which has devastated the country since 1964, reported Venezuelan news network Telesur on Monday.

According to Telesur, “high level sources within the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC have just signed an agreement to begin a formal peace dialogue.”

The Venezuelan news network confirmed a report by Colombian television station RCN that the formal peace talks are planned in the Norwegian capital of Oslo in October. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not confirm this for Colombia Reports.

Telesur reported that the Colombian president is soon to make the official announcement of the deal and the upcoming talks.

Newspaper El Espectador on Sunday reported that senior security adviser Sergio Jaramillo has been leading the government commission in Cuba that has been trying to prepare formal peace talks between the government and the guerrilla group that has been at war with the state since its foundation in 1964.

Jaramillo is reportedly being assisted by Environment Minister Frank Pearl who, according to U.S. diplomatic cables began seeking contact with the FARC when serving as peace commissioner under former President Alvaro Uribe.

  • Peace talks news archive

Colombia’s ambassador to Cuba, Gustavo Bell, reportedly is also involved in the talks. According to RCN, Santos’ brother Enrique has also been attending the meetings.

The Venezuelan government, while not directly involved in the preliminary, has been called on as mediator when talks turned sour, reported the newspaper.

According to both El Espectador and Telesur, the FARC’s spokesperson in Cuba is Mauricio Jaramillo, alias “El Medico,” one of the members of the guerrillas’ political leadership who “according to rumors” was accompanied by guerrilla commander “Ivan Marquez” on at least one occasion.

RCN reported that the government’s agenda has six basic themes which include FARC demobilization, ceasefire and the decommissioning of arms, all issues which have limited past efforts at negotiations.

The guerrilla group’s conditions consist of agricultural reform, renegotiation of multinational involvement in oil and mining industries, environmental issues and the involvement of social organizations in the eventual peace talks, reported radio station W last week.

While rumors of preliminary peace talks first surged in January, the still-unconfirmed negotiations were set high on the Colombian public and political agenda by Uribe a week ago.

Uribe’s rejection of peace talks caused the opposite reaction from Colombian congress, whosemajority of political parties voiced its support for a negotiated end to the 48-year old armed conflict, leaving the former president and his allies isolated.

According to a report by newspaper El Tiempo, the Uribe government was seeking talks with the FARC between 2005 and April 2010.

But Thomas Merton belonged to a generation that lived through real apocalypses brought about by political actors: Auschwitz, Hiroshima, and Vietnam. Mary Bryden, a specialist in modern literature, suggests that the recurrent apocalyptic motifs that surface in Merton’s writings reflect two somewhat contradictory notions of how the world might end: one emerging from religious expectation, and the other from a more plausible secular angst. In 1968, the year of his death (caused when an electric fan fell into his bathtub) he wrote in his diary that the news of the murder of Martin Luther King had pressed down upon him “like an animal, a beast of the apocalypse.”

But before this ends the article read:

This shift in doctrine clearly facilitates the cozy relationship between Mitt Romney, the first Mormon Saint ever to have a plausible shot at the US presidency, and his friend Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. During his recent visit to Jerusalem Romney delighted his hosts by calling the disputed city Israel’s capital, although the US and most other countries refuse to do so. He also suggested that because of their own cultural background (rather than the Israeli occupation) the Palestinians were incapable of showing the same level of ”economic vitality” as Israelis. Netanyahu was equally warm, praising and hugging Romney, clearly indicating that he wants Romney to defeat Obama in November. As the Haaretzcommentator Uri Misgav somewhat mischievously put it, the US-educated Netanyahu “doesn’t speak English or even American; he speaks fluent Republicanese.”

More alarming than “Republicanese,” however, may be the apocalyptic mindset both men share.

The CIA-engineered coup of 1953 has been the single most debilitating trauma of Iran in the 20th century. It is incorrect to blame the US or the UK for every calamity that has befallen Iran ever since, as it is foolhardy to discount the calamitous consequences of that singularly perfidious act of the US-UK treachery.

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Both President Obama and the former Secretary of State Madeline Albright have had occasions to apologise to Iranians publically for the US role in toppling Mosaddegh. But what do these apologies exactly mean in the context of continued US-EU imperial designs for Iran and the region, in the time of incessant crippling economic sanctions on Iranians, constant military threat by both the US and the US client colonial settlement of Israel?

To this day, the coup remains a gushing wound – a trauma that has benighted much of modern Iranian political culture and been widely abused by the Islamic Republic to justify its absolutist reign of terror.

The only person more neurotically fixated on the word “the enemy” than George W Bush is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – by which they both mean an amorphous entity incessantly plotting against them. If for George W Bush “the enemy” became the mantra of his “war on terror”, for Ali Khamenei it amounts to an obsessive-compulsive disorder – a kind of Tourette Syndrome – abusing the memory of the coup of 1953 to sustain his totalitarian regime in power.

American imperialism, picking up where the European imperialism left off, is a historical fact projected onto phantasmagorical proportions by the ruling regime for its own benefits. Among other things, the singular achievement of the most recent democratic uprising of Iranians known as the Green Movement put an effective end to that trauma and began to navigate a course of thinking beyond their postcolonial predicament.  

But against all these abuses, to this day the fragile democratic experience of Mohammad Mosaddegh remains a beacon of hope for Iranians at large. In the midst of a deeply divided a nation, scarce a political figure has been able to galvanise a widest possible spectrum of solidarity as Mohammad Mosaddegh, in part because almost 60 years after that treacherous act Iranians still face the same problem – that he tried to confront: domestic tyranny exacerbating globalised imperialism.

By the passage of history, the visage and legacy of Mohammad Mosaddegh has only gained in stature and significance. No wonder that monarchist revisionists altogether deny the coup and accuse Mosaddegh of populism, while the Islamic republic, beginning with Ayatollah Khomeini himself has consistently downplayed or distorted the legacy of Mosaddegh in the nationalisation of Iranian oil, and exaggerated the role of the clergy, while new evidence are now surfacing implicating the clergy itself in the coup.

What safeguards Mosaddegh from historical abuse and malicious distortion, whether by the ruling Islamists in Iran or by the exiled monarchists desperate to pose themselves as a legitimate alternative to the ruling regime, is the shining legacy of anti-colonial nationalism that links Mosaddegh to his contemporary heroes of the same cause – Nehru of India and Naser of Egypt in particular, the very engines behind the NAM. The Islamists and the monarchists might wish to distort the image of Mosaddegh, but what will they do to his memory in the hearts and minds of masses of millions of Indians and Arabs – in Cairo I have seen streets named after Mosaddegh.